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MOURNING THE LOSS OF COPYRIGHT’S UNSUNG HERO: 
DESTRUCTION OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
C. TODD MOSLEY1 
“Monopolies, though in certain cases useful, ought to be granted with 
caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year students spend hundreds of dollars on textbooks.3  And 
while most students’ are restricted to which books they can purchase for 
their class, they can typically choose the format. They can either buy an e-
textbook or a physical book.4  If the student decides to purchase the physi-
cal textbook, their choices expand a bit further. They may choose to buy a 
used book, new book, or even rent the same book at a discounted rate.5  
These alternative transactions provide a glimpse of our copyright system 
and, more specifically, the first sale doctrine. 
Depending upon which version the student chooses, his rights in the 
copyrighted work will differ drastically.6  The rights afforded to the student 
are based upon whether the student is considered an owner or simply a 
licensee.7  If, and only if, the student is considered an owner, may he then 
alienate his purchase without the consent of the copyright owner.8  The 
ability to alienate legally acquired copies of copyrighted material is deeply 
1.  Christopher Todd Mosley, J.D. Ohio Northern University Claude W. Pettit College of Law. I
want to thank my beautiful wife, Susanna Fleites, for her never ending love and patience. I would 
also like to thank Professor Deidre’ Keller for her guidance and inspiration for this article. Any errors 
found herein are mine and mine alone.  
2.  James Madison, Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments, pub-
lished posthumously in Galliard Hunt, Ed., “Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago,” 
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Vol 128, Number 766, Mar. 1914, at 489, 490. 
3.  Tyler Kingkade, College Textbook Prices Increasing Faster Than Tuition And Inflation, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 04, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/04/college-textbook-
prices-increase_n_2409153.html. 
4.  See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/KindleTextbooks/b?ie=UTF8&node=2223210011
(these choices can be found on here) (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
5.  Id.
6.  See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 577, 577 (2003). 
7.  See id. at 615. 
8.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
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rooted in United States’ common law.9 Similarly, it has been statutorily 
codified since 1909 as the first sale doctrine.10 
Now imagine a world where textbooks are leased instead of sold.11 In 
this bizarre “pay-to-see” world, a student is required to pay full price for a 
textbook that must be returned to the publisher at the end of each conclud-
ing semester.12 The publisher directly leases to the student, thereby destroy-
ing competition among retailers.13 “But it’s not all bad,” says the 
hypothetical publisher. “We give you extra digital features, which includes 
a full copy of the textbook that you can keep forever.” But the publisher 
knows that in our current legal system, those digital features, including the 
everlasting e-textbook, cannot be resold. This “pay-to-see” system is nei-
ther a trick nor illegal. It is just good business.14 
This bizarre world is upon us. In April 2014, a major textbook pub-
lishing company, Aspen Publishers, sent out an announcement that they 
intend to implement this “pay-to-see” program.15  How we approach the 
resale of copyrighted material is changing, and not for the better.16 The 
United States’ copyright system is slowly moving towards a monopolistic 
system that would make the Stationers’ Company proud.17 The “pay-to-
see” structure implements a textbook package filled with inalienable mate-
rial; thus, destroying important resale rights, while hampering secondary 
used markets that promotes creation and dissemination.18 It is imperative 
that the first sale doctrine’s strength is returned so that we may reclaim a 
balanced copyright system. 
 
 9.  See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 926 
(2011). 
 10.  Copyright Act 1909§ 41, Pub. Law 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed and superseded by the 
Copyright Act of 1976). 
 11.  See, e.g., ASPEN LAW, http://www.aspenlaw.com/pages/connected (last visited Nov 7, 2014). 
 12.  See BARRISTER BOOKS FAQ, http://www.barristerbooks.com/casebook-connect-faqs/#faq6 
(last visited Nov 7, 2014). 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  What may be considered a “good business practice,” is not necessarily good for copyright. 
Even though the copyright owner is be benefactor of this “practice,” the true primary beneficiary re-
ceives less than his intended share.   
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Josh Blackman, Aspen Casebook Connect Textbooks Must Be Returned At End Of Class, 
Cannot Be Resold, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (May 5, 2014), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/05/05/aspen-casebook-connect-textbooks-must-be-returned-at-end-
of-class-cannot-be-resold/.  
 17.  The Stationers’ Company enjoyed the sole right to print books in England from 1557 until 
1694. Craig Joyce, Prologue: The Statute of Anne: Yesterday and Today, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 782 
(2010). 
 18.  See BARRISTER BOOKS FAQ, supra note 12. 
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Since its inception, the first sale doctrine has helped provide balance 
between the conflicting rights of the copyright holder and the consumer.19 
The rights of these two parties are in constant divergence.20  If one party’s 
rights are expanded, it is at the expense of the other– hence the need for 
balance.21 The first sale doctrine was created to maintained equilibrium.22  
Yet, this balance may soon shift in the copyright holder’s favor.23 
Today, a digital equivalent of the first sale doctrine does not exist in 
American law.24  The lack of codified guidance has produced an expansion 
of copyright holder rights through restrictive licensing agreements.25 Courts 
have repeatedly upheld these agreements, and one court has perpetuated 
this expansion by stating that the first sale doctrine only applies to the ana-
log world.26  By holding the first sale doctrine inapplicable to digital down-
loads, courts have disrupted the fragile relationship between copyright 
holders and the public.27 
The strength of digital licenses has provided publisher with ammuni-
tion, which they have used to import licensing agreements to the analog 
world.28 For example, this type of licensing structure already exists in the 
form of textbook rentals and the Aspen Publishers agreement previously 
discussed.29 This comment presents the proposition that the first sale doc-
trine is in jeopardy.  Allowing digital works immunity from the first sale 
doctrine has created a disease that has begun to spread to the analog 
world.30 
Recently the United States Supreme Court held that the first sale doc-
trine applies to works lawfully made abroad.31 The Court had to decide 
whether the phrase “lawfully made under this title,” which is found in the 
 
 19.  Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocop-
ies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 (1970). 
 20.  See id. at 281–82. 
 21.  Rachel Ann Geist, A “License to Read”: The Effect of E-Books on Publishers, Libraries, and 
the First Sale Doctrine, 52 IDEA 63, 66 (2012). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See id. at 76. 
 24.  See Evan Hess, Code-Ifying Copyright: An Architectural Solution to Digitally Expanding the 
First Sale Doctrine, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2000 (2013) (discussing the rejection by the Copyright 
Office of a Digital First Sale Doctrine). 
 25.  Lukas Feiler, Birth of the First-Download Doctrine-the Application of the First-Sale Doctrine 
to Internet Downloads Under Eu and Us Copyright Law, 16 J. INTERNET L. 1, 16 (2012). 
 26.  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 27.  Geist,  supra note 21, at 75. 
 28.  Gary Donatello, Killing the Secondary Market: How the Ninth Circuit Interpreted Vernor and 
Aftermath to Destroy the First Sale Doctrine, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 59, 81 (2012). 
 29.  See ASPEN LAW, http://www.aspenlaw.com/pages/connected (last visited Nov 7, 2014). 
 30.  See BARRISTER BOOKS FAQ, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 31.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013). 
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first sale doctrine,32 included a geographic limitation.33 By rejecting the 
publisher’s argument favoring a geographic limitation, the Court has creat-
ed a hardship for publishers who rely on international market segmenta-
tion.34  Now unable to divide the international book market, publishers 
have begun using creative methods to eschew the first sale doctrine.35 
This comment asserts that publishers will continue to solve the inter-
national market segmentation issue by applying digital licensing agree-
ments to physical books.36  By selling consumers only a license to use the 
book, publishers will preclude consumers from reselling their used books, 
thereby extinguishing the usefulness of the first sale doctrine.37  If these 
types of licenses remain unchecked by the first sale doctrine, they will cre-
ate an imbalance among copyright holders and consumers that will prove 
detrimental to society;38 an imbalance the first sale doctrine was intended to 
remedy.39 
Part I of this comment begins with a brief history of copyright law. 
This section reveals an important understanding regarding the proper bal-
ance that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution. Next, Section B 
examines the history of the first sale doctrine. In this section, the comment 
will explore the reasons the first sale doctrine was created and how it ad-
vances the primary and secondary intent of the Constitution’s Copyright 
Clause.  Furthermore, this section will articulate the importance of recog-
nizing the primary and secondary considerations when analyzing copyright 
issues. It will show that the primary intent of the Constitution’s Copyright 
Clause was to create a learned society, while the secondary consideration 
was to provide authors with fair treatment and an incentive to create.40 The 
first sale doctrine, by eliminating copyright holder’s control of downstream 
commerce, exemplifies the primary goal of the copyright clause and there-
fore, must not be taken for granted.41  Lastly this section will demonstrate 
 
 32.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 33.  Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See, e.g., Diepiriye A. Anga, Intellectual Property Without Borders? The Effect of Copyright 
Exhaustion on Global Commerce, 10 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 53, 68 (2014). 
 36.  See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1370 (“Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical inter-
pretation will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers (and other copyright holders) to 
divide foreign and domestic markets. We concede that is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to 
charge different prices for the same book in different geographic markets.”); Anga, supra note 35, at 68. 
 37.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 38.  See Hess, supra note 24, at 1979.  
 39.  Id. at 1972. 
 40.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 41.  Id. 
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that the first sale doctrine was created to ensure that the copyright holder 
did not receive more rights than necessary to incentivize creation.42 
Part II presents modern problems facing the first sale doctrine.  First, 
this section will examine the first sale doctrine as it applies to digital 
works. It will show congressional erosion of the first sale doctrine by dif-
ferent enactments, including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. This 
comment will then address how different courts approach licensing issues 
and how they decide whether the purchaser is an owner or a licensee. 
Part II, Section B, examines the recent Supreme Court case, John 
Wiley & Son v. Kirtsaeng.43 The Kirtsaeng case has proven to be an inter-
esting quagmire, as it has managed to simultaneously strengthen and weak-
en the first sale doctrine.44  First, the Kirstsaeng decision strengthened the 
first sale doctrine by disallowing international market segmentation when 
the Court held that books made abroad may lawfully be imported into the 
U.S. without the copyright owner’s permission.45 Secondly, Kirtsaeng 
weakened the first sale doctrine by disrupting publisher’s international 
market segmentation model, which ensured that cheaper international-
books remained abroad.46  In the opinion of this comment, this holding has 
weakened the first sale doctrine because publishers will attempt to remove 
the doctrine’s applicability from physical book sales to remedy lost sales 
attributable to their inability to effectively segment international book mar-
kets. 
Part III offers an analysis of recent cases and presents a “how to man-
ual” for creating a license agreement for physical books. This section dis-
plays how easily publisher can legally avoid the first sale doctrine. 
Part IV of this comment provides some alternative suggestions regard-
ing how to prevent the destruction of the first sale doctrine.  The first solu-
tion includes legislation that would expressly prohibits licensing structures 
to be applied to analog books; this would be the most direct solution for the 
physical copyright world. 
The first solution, however, does nothing to resolve the digital media 
problem.  Therefore, the second solution argues in favor of implementing a 
digital first sale doctrine.  The legislation of a digital first sale doctrine 
would create a two-fold solution. First, it would resolve publisher’s self-
 
 42.  See Maureen Steimer, Restoring the Balance: Bringing Back Consumer Rights in Umg Re-
cordings v. Augusto by Reaffirming the First Sale Doctrine in Copyright Law, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L.J. 313, 325 (2009). 
 43.  133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 44.  Infra Part II.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.  
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interested push to digital books just to ensure they maintain control over 
subsequent alienation. Second, this solution would further stymie the cur-
rent campaign to create an equivalent licensing structure for physical copy-
righted material. 
Lastly, this comment suggests adopting the often-stated directive of 
Congress, the “need to conform the U.S. copyright term with the prevailing 
worldwide standard.”47  If the U.S. were to follow this directive, Congress 
would be required to look at the recent European Court of Justice case that 
reclassified a perpetual software license as a sale of software.48  In Used-
Soft v. Oracle,49 the European Court of Justice held that a perpetual soft-
ware license is equivalent to a sale of software and should be characterized 
as such.50 In this case, the first sale doctrine applied to digitally download-
ed software even though copyright holder intended to convey only a li-
cense.51 This holding abolishes the ability to disguise a software sale by 
labeling it a license.52  Furthermore, the ECJ held that the first sale doctrine 
does not distinguish between physical and digital copyrighted materials. 
This comment will demonstrate that this same reasoning should be applied 
in U.S. jurisprudence.  If this type of analysis were applied to current li-
censing models, we would have a workable solution that maintains the 
balance between copyright holders and society. 
I. THE HISTORY 
A. History of United States Copyright and Its Intent 
To better understand the intended function of the first sale doctrine, it 
is important to understand the intent and history of U.S. copyright law in 
general.  For example, if it is understood that the underlying intent of the 
copyright clause is to enrich authors, the first sale doctrine should be lim-
ited by this understanding, as this would be the overarching principal.53  
However, if the intent is to provide a valuable public service, while only 
providing authors with an incentive to create as a secondary objective, then 
the first sale doctrine should be applied to achieve these objectives in their 
relative order of importance.  Therefore, this comment presents the history 
of our Constitution’s Copyright Clause to show the overarching intent was 
 
 47.  144 CONG. REC. S12377–78. (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 48.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at ¶ 101. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  This understanding is completely without merit and was only suggest in making a contrasting 
point.  
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to create a learned society;54 and as such, this primary intent should be 
considered when deciding whether the first sale doctrine should apply to 
license agreements that seek to undermine this intent. 
1. English History 
In 1710, after the failure of England’s Crown-controlled copyright 
law– one that granted sole copyright control to The Stationers’ Company– 
the Crown enacted the Statute of Anne.55 This statue was the first in Eng-
land to give authors a statutory right in their works.56  The exact failure that 
led to the Statute of Anne is a subject of debate.57 Some scholars argue that 
it was in direct response and an attempt to breakup the oppressive monopo-
ly held by The Stationers’ Company.58 Others have asserted that is was 
enacted to maximize creation and distribution.59 Either way, both assertions 
have a common nucleus: promoting societal good.60  This intended effect is 
evidenced by the first sentence of the statute, which declared that the stat-
ute was “An act for the encouragement of learning. . .”61  Furthermore, the 
language of the statute expressly rebuked publishers for their poor treat-
ment of authors: 
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently 
taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing. . . without the 
consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their 
very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families: 
for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for the en-
couragement of learned men to compose and write useful books.62 
This statute developed from the basic understanding that information 
and education may be impeded if those who do not have an incentive to 
create hold the copyright monopoly.63  Therefore, it can be said that the 
public good was the “ends” that were met by the “means” of providing 
creators with incentives to create.64 This understanding was imported into 
our own copyright law, as our Constitution’s Copyright Clause, and the 
 
 54.  Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and 
Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 423 (2004). 
 55.  Joyce, supra 17, at 782.  
 56.  See id. at 783. 
 57.  See id. at 782 n.9. 
 58.  LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143–44 (1968).   
 59.  RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) 45–46 (2004).  
 60.  Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 63.  See generally Joyce, supra note 44. 
 64.  Id. 
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subsequent Copyright Act of 1790, has been considered a wholesale copy 
of the Statute of Anne.65 
2. Constitutional Drafting and the Founding Fathers 
As evidenced by language similarities, the Founding Fathers imported 
the ideology of the Statute of Anne into the Copyright Clause of the Consti-
tution, which later served as a guide in producing the Copyright Act of 
1790.66  However, considering the problems created by the pre-Statute of 
Anne monopoly– which was solely vested in The Stationers’ Company– 
the Founding Fathers feared another government-sponsored monopoly.67 
James Madison noted that even though this fear was well founded, a mo-
nopoly right vested in a copyright holder was substantially necessary. Mad-
ison recognized that the inherent good produced by a learned society 
outweighed the possible detrimental effects.68 Madison stated in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson in 1788: 
With regard to monopolies, they are justly classed among the greatest 
nuisances in government. But is it clear that as encouragements to liter-
ary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be 
wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to 
the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of 
it?69 
 
 65.  Oren Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: 
The Life of A Legal Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427, 1428 (2010). “While the influence of 
the Statute of Anne on early American copyright legislation is widely known, scholars often overlook 
the scale of duplication on the level of ideological purposes, concepts, technical legal arrangements, and 
specific text. When these identical features are examined closely, the genesis of the American copyright 
system appears to be a major operation of international plagiarism.” Id.  
 66.  See id. 
 67.  
The great evil in the Framers’ mind, second only to the great evil of centralized, monarchical 
government, was the evil of state-sanctioned monopoly. And though they struggled over 
whether any power to grant monopolies should be vested in Congress at all, the power upon 
which they settled spoke volumes about the limitations it was to embrace: Unlike every other 
power-granting clause, this was the only power-granting clause that specified the means and 
purpose to which the power was devoted. Congress was not given the power simply to enact 
copyrights. Nor was it simply given the power to enact copyrights for limited times. Congress 
was given the power ‘to promote the Progress of Science’ by granting, not to publishers, but 
to authors, ‘exclusive Right[s]’ for limited Times.’ 
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1062 (2001).  
 68.  See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past 
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 424 (2004). 
 69.  Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress As A 
Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1805 (2006).  James Madi-
son, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788, in Galliard Hunt, Ed., 5 The Writings of James 
Madison, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904, 269, 274–275. “With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed 
among the greatest nusances [sic] in Government.” 
MOSLEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:10 AM 
2015] FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 243 
Convinced that a copyright monopoly would produce more good than 
harm for society, Madison and the other Founding Fathers70 voiced the 
importance of perpetuating inventions and artistic creations in order to 
thrive as a modern society.71  And to ensure the monopoly stayed in check, 
the Founding Fathers mandated congressional constraints.72 
One major limitation placed upon Congress is the inherent balancing 
act,73 which was intended to balance the conflicting rights of society and a 
copyright holder.  These two interests must be balanced in order to ensure 
an efficient flow of creation and dissemination to society.74  The first sale 
doctrine was created as a counterweight that is necessary to balance these 
two rights.75  The Founders feared that the primary intent of the Copyright 
Clause– the creation of a learned society– would cease to be primary, while 
the secondary intent– to allow authors to reap the rewards of their works– 
would become a dominating factor.76  Without the first sale doctrine, copy-
 
 70.  Thomas Jefferson wrote the following in a letter to Madison: “I like it, as far as it goes; but I 
should have been for going further. For instance, the following alterations and additions would have 
pleased me. . . Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature, and their 
own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding ___ years, but for no longer term, and no other 
purpose.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, August 28, 1789, in Andrew A. Lipscomb, Ed., 
7 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 
1903, p 444, 450–51. 
 71.  Craig Dallon, supra at 367; James Madison,  Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago, 
Harper’s Magazine, Vol 128, Number 766, March, 1914, p.  490.  
Monopolies, though in certain cases useful, ought to be granted with caution, and guarded with strict-
ness against abuse. The Constitution of the United States has limited them to two cases—the authors of 
books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are considered as a compensation for a benefit 
actually gained to the community as a purchase of property which the owner might otherwise withhold 
from public use. There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases; but it ought to 
be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompense and encouragement may be giv-
en. . .Perpetual monopolies of every sort are forbidden not only by the genius of free governments, but 
by the imperfection of human foresight. Id. 
 72.  See Dotan Oliar, supra note 69, at 1781–83. (Talking about Thomas Jefferson’s strict inter-
pretation of how the monopoly terms should work, “[t]here are different schools of thought here; the 
first interpretation asserts that the promotion of the sciences and useful arts is a congressional con-
straint. The second is that this phrase was only a preamble, which does not limit congresses power.”). 
Id.  
 73.  See Elizabeth McKenzie, A Book by Any Other Name: E-Books and the First Sale Doctrine, 
12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 57, 69 (2013). “First, these practices are incompatible with existing 
copyright doctrine and eliminate any right of alienability for digital content, a right that has long been 
considered crucial in the copyright system’s balance between the public’s interests and those of rights 
holders.” Id. 
 74.  See Sarah Abelson, An Emerging Secondary Market for Digital Music the Legality of Redigi 
and the Extent of the First Sale Doctrine, 29 WTR ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 8, 10 (2012). 
 75.  Id., “The first sale doctrine is an example of this balance, offering a middle ground between 
the author’s exclusive right to distribute and the public’s right to access copyrighted works.” Id. 
 76.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932). 
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right holders would receive a monopoly right that exemplifies the very fear 
the Founding Fathers recognized and sought to avoid.77 
3. Constitutional Intent: Understanding the Primary and Secondary 
Beneficiaries 
Justice John Paul Stevens clearly articulated the primary intent of 
copyright in the Supreme Court case, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.78 He stated: 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlim-
ited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, 
the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may 
be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive 
control has expired. . . As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is 
Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the lim-
ited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order 
to give the public appropriate access to their work product.79 
Further, Justice William O. Douglas acknowledged that “[t]he copy-
right law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.”80  And it was Justice Charles Evan Hughes who stated: 
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring 
the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the 
labors of authors.”81  Lastly, Justice Potter Stewart stated: “The limited 
scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copy-
right duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and 
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of pro-
moting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”82 
These statements flesh out the intended hierarchy of copyright’s bene-
ficiaries, and they were intended to create a balance between the copyright 
holder and the public’s interest, prioritizing primary over secondary con-
siderations.83  It must be understood that the Founding Fathers did not give 
 
 77.  See Madison supra note 2.  
 78.  464 U.S. 417 at 429. 
 79.  Id.  But see Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 873, 889 (2012) (“Even were we writing on a clean 
slate, petitioners’ argument would be unavailing. Nothing in the text of the Copyright Clause confines 
the Progress of Science exclusively to incentives for creation. Evidence from the founding, moreover, 
suggests that inducing dissemination—as opposed to creation—was viewed as an appropriate means to 
promote science.”) This view of copyright intent gives great deference to Congress in defining what 
“Progress” actually means, and in the Golan case, “Progress” was equal to dissemination. See id.   
 80.  Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 158.  
 81.  Fox Film Corp. 286 U.S. 123 at 127. 
 82.  Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 83.  Id. 
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copyright holders a legalized monopoly to primarily benefit the holder.84  
The Copyright Act was meant to be “[a]n Act for the encouragement of 
learning. . .”85  And “the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good.”86  Therefore, the primary 
purpose of the Copyright Clause was intended to promote the “general 
public good,” and the first sale doctrine must be viewed with this intent in 
mind.87 
B. History of the First Sale Doctrine 
The origin of the first sale doctrine dates back as far as 1853.88In 
Stowe v. Thomas, the Pennsylvania Circuit Court stated that “[w]hen [the 
copyright owner] has sold his book, the only property which be [sic] re-
serves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to 
multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters which ex-
hibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed.”89 This 
statement recognizes the boundaries and exhaustion principles placed on 
copyright holders.90 It further exemplifies the understanding that copyright 
holders were never intended to receive an expansive array of rights that 
included downstream alienation control.91 
Then in 1885, the Circuit Court for District of Massachusetts in Clem-
ens v. Estes, denied the plaintiff’s request for an injunction that would re-
strain the defendant from selling the book “Huckleberry Finn” at a 
discounted price.92 The court found that in the absence of a contract, “the 
defendants had a right to buy. . . books from agents who lawfully obtained 
them by purchase from the plaintiff or his publishers, and had a right to 
advertise for sale and to sell such books at any price they saw fit.”93 This 
same theme runs throughout American copyright law: the idea that once 
value has been given, the copyright owner’s right to vend ends with that 
specific copy. 
 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Sony, 464 U.S. 417 at 460. 
 86.  Sony 464 U.S. 417 at 432. 
 87.  Id.  
 88. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853)  
 89.  Id. at  206–07. 
 90.  See id. at 207. 
 91.  See id.  
 92.  Clemens v. Estes, 22 F. 899, 901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885). 
 93.  Id. at 900–01. 
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In 1908, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus was the first Supreme Court case 
to recognize the first sale doctrine.94 Justice William R. Day wrote the 
opinion, which led to the codification of the first sale doctrine in the 1909 
Copyright Act.95 The case involved a retail price restriction on the novel 
“The Castaway.”96  The Bobbs-Merrill Company was the copyright holder 
of the novel97 and attempted to stipulate the minimum retail sale price of 
the book.98  Included inside the cover of each book was a notice that stated: 
“The price of this book at retail is $1 net.  No dealer is licensed to sell it at 
a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of 
the copyright.”99 
The nonexistence of a contract precluded the Court from using con-
tract law to settle the dispute.100 The Court stated that without privity of 
contract, only copyright could afford a remedy.101  Therefore, this case 
appeared before the Supreme Court in equity,102 which required the Court 
to interpret the Copyright Act.103 The issue before the Court was whether 
the phrase “sole right to vend” included subsequent alienation.104  Justice 
Day, writing for the majority, interpreted the copyright statute as follows: 
In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the 
copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create 
the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limita-
tion at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with 
whom there is no privity of contract. This conclusion is reached in view 
of the language of the statute, read in the light of its main purpose to se-
cure the right of multiplying copies of the work,—a right which is the 
special creation of the statute. . . To add to the right of exclusive sale the 
 
 94.  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908).  
 95.  See generally id.  at 339. 
 96.  Id. at 341. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id.   
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 349.  
As this is a suit in equity for relief under § 4970 of the U. S. Revised Statutes, giving to the circuit and 
district courts of the United States the right to grant relief by injunctions to prevent the violation of 
rights secured by the copyright statutes, we are not concerned with rights and remedies under § 4965. 
Id.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 349–50.  
What does the statute mean in granting ‘the sole right of vending the same?’ Was it intended to create a 
right which would permit the holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book or upon one of the 
articles mentioned within the statute, a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter 
of copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and 
had given a satisfactory price for it? It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without 
restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by 
authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of 
it. Id. 
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authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must 
be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of 
the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, be-
yond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legis-
lative intent in its enactment.105 
This holding identifies the fragile balance between the monopoly 
rights of copyright holders and the primary intent for allowing a legally 
enforced monopoly– to create a learned society.106  It also presents an un-
derstanding that restriction on subsequent alienation was not an inherent 
part of the copyright monopoly.107 The Court recognized that if this re-
striction was allowed, it would tilt the balance too far in the copyright 
holder’s favor, as it would allow extreme restrictions on downstream com-
merce, greatly expanding the copyright holder’s monopoly.108 
Shortly after Bobbs-Merrill, the first sale doctrine was codified in the 
1909 Copyright Act.109 Section 41 of the 1909 Copyright Act stated: 
That the copyright is distinct from the property in the material object 
copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the ma-
terial object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright, nor 
shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a transfer of the title to 
the material object; but nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, 
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the 
possession of which has been lawfully obtained.110 
The first sale doctrine’s basic forbearance on transfer restrictions still 
remains in the revised 1976 Copyright act.111 Section 109 now represents 
the first sale doctrine.112  This section maintains the basic essence of the 
1909 Act, as only minor changes were made to the language.113  Section 
109 states that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of 
 
 105.  Id at 350–51. 
 106.  See also Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. 151 at 156 (Justice Potter identified the 
balancing equity at work in the copyright.). 
 107.  See Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. 339 at 349–50. 
 108.  See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 
1993). It is worth noting that the idea of a legal monopoly was a very scary proposition for the Found-
ing Fathers of the Constitution. It was with great reluctance they allowed this legal monopoly but only 
because they believed that this type of monopoly would do more good to society than harm.  
 109.  See McKenzie supra note 73 at 60. 
 110.  Copyright Act  of 1909, 1 Stat. 124 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010)).  
 111.  See H.R. REP. 94-1476, 62, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676. “As section 109 makes clear, 
however, the copyright owner’s rights under section 106(3) cease with respect to a particular copy or 
phonorecord once he has parted with ownership of it.” Id. 
 112.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 113.  Unlike the 1909 act, the 1976 Copyright Act section 109 did not distinguish between the 
physical object and the copyright. See Matthew Chiarizio, An American Tragedy: E-Books, Licenses, 
and the End of Public Lending Libraries?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 615, 620 (2013). 
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the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”114  This section fully embraces 
the holding of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.115 It codifies the exhaustion of 
the copyright holder’s power to restrict subsequent sales once the consumer 
legally obtains a “copy” of the copyrighted material.116 
II. MODERN FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
With a clear understanding of the intent that underlies our Constitu-
tion’s Copyright Clause, an examination of the modern first sale doctrine 
can prove more fruitful.  Keeping the primary and secondary intent in 
mind, the first sale doctrine becomes an obvious necessity and an important 
feature of our copyright law that ensures society receives, as the primary 
beneficiary, its quid pro quo.117 
A. The Destruction of the First Sale Doctrine as Applied to Digital 
Works 
Under current U.S. copyright law, only an owner may assert the first 
sale doctrine.118 So when determining whether the first sale doctrine ap-
plies, it is extremely important to understand the characterization of the 
transaction in which the copyrighted material is exchanged.  Thus, if the 
purchase of digital media is characterized as a license, then the first sale 
doctrine does not apply, as this defense to infringement is afforded only to 
“owners” of legally acquired copies of copyrighted material.119  In contrast, 
if the purchase of digital media is characterized as a sale of copyrighted 
content, then consumers are free to alienate their legally acquired digital 
media under the first sale doctrine.120 
This rule is easily stated but difficult to apply.  When faced with soft-
ware, digital works, and analog material, courts have had trouble discerning 
whether a conveyance is a sale or a license.121  However, a well-drafted 
license agreement will ensure immunity from the first sale doctrine for all 
formats. These transactions, in the view of this comment, should be im-
 
 114.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 115.  See generally Bobbs-Merrill, Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339,  351. 
 116.  See H.R. REP. 94-1476, 62, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676; See also Chiarizio supra note 
115 at 620.  
 117.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Justice Breyer’s dissent) (Consequently, the 
original British copyright statute, the Constitution’s Framers, and our case law all have recognized 
copyright’s resulting and necessary call for balance.); but see id. (the majority rejects the idea that there 
is an inherent quid pro quo in which Congress must consider before revising the Copyright Act.). 
 118.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 119.  See id.  
 120.  See id.  
 121.  See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2010); but compare id. at 1115.  
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permissible, as they are mutually exclusive to the primary purpose of copy-
right.122 Furthermore, the congressional and judicial erosion of the first sale 
doctrine must end, and a digital first sale doctrine must be enacted to re-
balance the copyright scale.123 
1. Software: A Not So Easy Case 
Software has presented copyright law with some tough and often con-
flicting cases.  For many years software has been the ugly stepsister of the 
intellectual property world.124 Currently, software jurisprudence is a mud-
dled mess of capriciousness mixed with a congressional “wait and see” 
approach that tends create erratic results.125  If digital media is allowed to 
follow the same path as software, then the ability to license digital media 
will not only dominate the digital world, but it will strengthen publishers’ 
resolve to create the same type of license structure for analog material. 
2. Congressional Erosion of the First Sale Doctrine: DMCA’s Effect 
on the First Sale Doctrine 
One of Congress’ not-so-shining moments occurred when the Internet 
was in its infancy.126 The anti-circumvention provision of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (hereinafter DMCA) has been called one of the 
“greatest limitation[s] on the first sale doctrine.”127 The DMCA was enact-
ed in response to copyright holders’ fear of piracy.128 Copyright holders 
feared the instantaneous dissemination of large amounts of copyrighted 
material.129  One of the key provisions of the DMCA is the anti-
circumvention provision.130  Under this provision, it is illegal to create or 
use anti-circumvention software to decrypt or decode protections embed-
ded in copyrighted works.131  Even if the purpose of this enactment is legit-
 
 122.  See Matthew Chiarizio, supra note 115 at 618–19. 
 123.  See id.  
 124.  See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” 
Really Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 557 (2004). 
 125.  Geist, supra note 21, at 78. 
 126.  Matthew Friedman, Nine Years and Still Waiting: While Congress Continues to Hold Off on 
Amending Copyright Law for the Digital Age, Commercial Industry Has Largely Moved on, 17 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 637, 643 (2010).  
 127.  Id. at 647. 
 128.  Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles “N Bits: Making A Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible, 9 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002). 
 129.  See Calaba, supra note 108 at 18.  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 19–20. 
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imate, it violates the first sale doctrine by limiting the scope and possibility 
to sale used works.132 
The DMCA explicitly ablates the first sale doctrine in two distinctive 
scenarios. First, the DMCA restrictions disallow owners of DVDs from 
circumventing Content Scrambling Systems (CSS).133 Circumvention of 
this protection would allow users to play DVDs on an unlicensed DVD 
player.134  It is argued that this reduces the value of the DVD because it 
hinders the ability to resell the DVD.135  Since a buyer must have a licensed 
DVD player in order to watch the movie, only those who own such a player 
will have a reason to purchase the DVD.  This essentially restricts the 
number of potential buyers, which is the exact evil the first sale doctrine 
was meant to remedy.136 
The second scenario that arguably limits the first sale doctrine is the 
use of region coding.137  Region coding is used by DVD manufactures to 
restrict DVD viewing to specific regions.138 Similar to the market-division 
issue presented in Kirtsaeng,139 the copyright holder of the DVD encodes a 
region code, which disallows users of different countries from viewing, and 
ultimately buying, DVDs that originate in other countries.140  In all practi-
cality, this constraint is no different than attempting to restrict international 
books from being imported into the U.S. These types of restriction should 
not be upheld.  This restriction essentially allows copyright holders to di-
vide the global market and efficaciously restrict downstream commerce 
without worrying about the first sale doctrine141 
The deleterious provisions of the DMCA embody a knee-jerk reaction 
to piracy fears.142 This erosion of the first sale doctrine can be further at-
tributed to Congress’ failure to adequately apply a balancing component to 
these antagonistic fears.143  The DMCA has been soundly criticized for 
granting copyright holders far more rights than necessary.144  Whether this 
failure can be attributed to deep-pocketed lobbyists or uninformed con-
 
 132.  See Friedman, supra note 128, at 644. 
 133.  See Calaba supra note 130 at 22–24. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  See Id. 
 137.  See Calaba supra note 130 at 23. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1371.  
 140.  U.S. Copyright Office, A Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to §104 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (2001), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-
report-vol-1.pdf.  
 141.  See Calaba supra note 130 at 9. 
 142.  Id.  
 143.  See Friedman, supra note 128 at 644. 
 144.  Id.  
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gressmen, the harsh results remain the same.145  This type of hastily enacted 
legislation must be acknowledged, understood, and considered strictly ver-
boten.146 
3. Judicial Erosion: Software and Other Digital Media 
Congress is not the only branch of government that has debased the 
first sale doctrine. The following cases show how courts’ judicial analyses 
of the first sale doctrine and their decisions as to whether it applies to spe-
cific conveyances, has further eroded the first sale doctrine.  The represen-
tation of these cases attempts to explicate a structure which publishers may 
use to avoid the first sale doctrine. Furthermore, these cases can be consol-
idated and used as a “how-to manual” that could create a valid license for 
both digital and analog material. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc.,147 that the consumer of Autodesk’s AutoCAD Release 14 software 
was not an owner of a particular copy of its software, but rather a licen-
see.148  Since the consumer in this case was found to be a licensee, he was 
precluded from raising the first sale doctrine.149  Following its own prece-
dent, the court enumerated three identifiable areas to consider when decid-
ing whether a software consumer is a licensee or an owner.150  The court 
stated: 
We read Wise and the MAI trio to prescribe three considerations that we 
may use to determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than 
an owner of a copy. First, we consider whether the copyright owner 
specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether 
the copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer 
the software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner imposes 
notable use restrictions.151 
Following these considerations, the court found that Autodesk had ef-
fectively retained the title to its AutoCAD software, imposed transferability 
restriction, and levied various use restrictions.152  By including these provi-
 
 145.  Id. at 645; See Hess, supra note 24. (“The DMCA created a number of safeguards for copy-
right holders. But the DMCA purposely ignored whether copyright holders could restrict future trans-
fers of their legally purchased work—a concept known in physical property as the ‘first sale doctrine.’ 
As a result, copyright holders began using licenses to control future transfers of their digital property.”).  
 146.  See Hess supra note 24 at 2008. 
 147.  621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 148.  See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111, (9th Cir. 2010). 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 152.  See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111, (9th Cir. 2010). 
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sions in its software licenses agreement (SLA), Autodesk was able to elude 
the first sale doctrine.153  However, not all copyright holders are so lucky. 
A year after the Vernor ruling, the same court, in UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. Augusto,154 held that a copyright holder of a promotional music CD 
did not convey a license to music insiders when they distributed their 
CD.155  Augusto, who acquired many of these promotional CDs, resold 
these promotional CDs on eBay.156  The following statement, which UMG 
hoped would be considered a license, was placed on many of the CDs at 
issue: 
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the in-
tended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall con-
stitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale or 
transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under feder-
al and state laws.157 
Despite this restrictive statement, the court found that Augusto was an 
owner of a copy rather than a licensee.158  The court reasoned that the re-
striction did not amount to a license because the recipient failed to 
acknowledge the consummation of a license agreement.159 
The UMG court distinguished its holding from Vernor.160  The court 
recognized the disconnect from its earlier “three consideration test,”161 but 
resolved these differences by articulating that Vernor’s “three consideration 
test” only applies to a narrower category of software consumers who have 
paid for the product.162 Unlike Vernor, UMG’s CDs were promotional in 
nature and gratuitously distributed without a valid request from the receiv-
er.163 This is a surprising twist considering the defendant in Vernor re-
ceived inferior rights to a product he purchased, while the defendant in 
UMG received superior rights to CDs that were gratuitously given to him. 
It is unclear whether the court’s holding would have changed if the 
consumer had requested or purchased the promotional CDs. However, it is 
more likely than not that the “three consideration test” approach would 
 
 153.  Id. at 1115. 
 154.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 155.  Id. at 1180. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 1177–78. 
 158.  Id. at 1180. 
 159.  Id. at 1182 (Because the record here is devoid of any indication that the recipients agreed to a 
license, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that licenses were established under the terms of 
the promotional statement. Accordingly, we conclude that UMG’s transfer of possession to the recipi-
ents, without meaningful control or even knowledge of the status of the CDs after shipment, accom-
plished a transfer of title.”).   
 160.  Id. at 1182–83. 
 161.  Id. at 1183. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id.  
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have been applied had the CD been requested rather than freely distribut-
ed.164 
In the next case, Capital Records, LLC. v. ReDigi Inc., the District 
Court of the Southern District of New York held that the resale of digital 
music was an infringement of the content owner’s license agreement.165  
ReDigi developed software that, once installed on the user’s computer, 
would search the user’s computer for music that could be uploaded to ReD-
igi’s cloud.166  After the software successfully uploaded the music to the 
cloud, the software would automatically delete the user’s copy from his 
computer; this is known as “forward-and-delete.”167  Thereafter, the user 
would only be able to stream the music from the cloud or make it available 
for sale on ReDigi’s market place.168 
Even though the district court held that this process was considered a 
reproduction of an unlawful copy169 and, therefore, ReDigi was not afford-
ed the defense of the first sale doctrine, the more interesting and troubling 
pronouncement by this court was its holding that only material items are 
afforded the first sale doctrine.170  This overly restrictive view of the first 
sale doctrine is extremely problematic and damaging to the fundamental 
copyright balance.  Under the district court’s understanding of the first sale 
doctrine, any digital material a consumer purchases may never be resold, 
rented, lent, or gifted without violating the license agreement.171 
The district court in ReDigi displays an inherent misunderstanding of 
the intended purpose of the first sale doctrine.172  This misunderstanding is 
problematic for two main reasons. First, as society embraces digital media, 
the ability to use the first sale doctrine to secure alienation of one’s person-
al library becomes impossible because personal libraries will progressively 
consist of more digital media.173  The court’s misunderstanding of the first 
sale doctrine creates a digitally centered approach for publishers, which 
creates an imbalance between the primary and secondary intent of Copy-
right. 
 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 640, 660–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 166.  Id. at 646. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 655. 
 170.  “The first sale defense is limited to material items, like records, that the copyright owner put 
into the stream of commerce.”) Id.  
 171.  See id.  
 172.  See generally id.  
 173.  See id. 
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Secondly, it reinforces the idea that restrictive licenses are “king.”  
This becomes more problematic as publishers discover the fruitfulness of 
licensing digital as well as physical books.174  Physical book restrictions 
will become the equivalent of digital licensing agreements, thereby dimin-
ishing future conveyances of used books. 
B. The Destruction of the First Sale Doctrine as Applied to Physical 
Works 
John Wiley & Son Inc., v. Kirtsaeng,175 is an important case that laid 
the groundwork for predicting the next generation of copyright conveyanc-
es.  In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court undoubtedly strengthened the first 
sale doctrine by holding that certain copyrighted materials created abroad, 
in compliance with the United States’ copyright laws, will be given the 
protection of the first sale doctrine.176  However, it is the proposition of this 
comment that this newfound strength will drive publishers to seek creative 
ways to thwart the first sale doctrine. 
Kirtsaeng, a Thai national studying in the United States, received nu-
merous books from his home country of Thailand, which were required for 
his courses.177  These books were significantly cheaper than the nearly 
identical books sold in the United States.178  Kirtsaeng subsequently decid-
ed to sell these books for profit on eBay.179  Soon thereafter, the publisher, 
John Wiley & Son, brought a copyright infringement claim against 
Kirtsaeng for his importation of these international books.180 
Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s importation was an infringement of its 
copyright.  Specifically, Wiley asserted that Kirtsaeng infringed on its dis-
tribution rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) and the importation ban codified 
under 17 U.S.C. § 602.181  It is § 602 that renders importing copyrighted 
material an infringement on the copyright holder’s right to control distribu-
tion under § 106.182  However, § 106 is subject to a number of exceptions 
and affirmative defenses to infringement; these are found in § 107 through 
 
 174.  Elizabeth McKenzie, A Book by Any Other Name: E-Books and the First Sale Doctrine, 12 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 57 (2013) (“The Association of American Publishers (AAP) has estimated 
that e-book sales have grown by 202.3% in less than a year.”).  
 175.  133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 176.  Id. at 1371. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded 
to 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 180.  See Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1352.  
 181.  Id. 
 182.  17 U.S.C. § 602 (2002). 
MOSLEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:10 AM 
2015] FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 255 
§ 122.183  The first sale doctrine, an affirmative defense to copyright in-
fringement, 184 is found in § 109 and applies to an owner’s right to distrib-
ute.185  Despite this seemingly simple application of the first sale doctrine, 
the Supreme Court had to further analyze the language of § 109, which 
stated that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made 
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without 
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”186  Thus, the ultimate issue for the 
Court was whether the phrase “lawfully made under this title” meant that 
the copyrighted material had to be made within the United States or wheth-
er the copyrighted material, regardless of its origin, only needed to comply 
with the United States’ Copyright Act.187  In the end, the Supreme Court 
held that foreign books only need to comply with the United States’ Copy-
right Act to be afforded the protections and defenses codified thereto.188 
It is the opinion of this comment that, after Kirtsaeng, publishers will 
attempt to hedge their fiscal dysphoria caused by their inability to efficient-
ly segment international book markets, by eschewing the first sale doc-
trine.189  Essentially, by holding that copyrighted content legally purchased 
outside of the United States is afforded the protections of the first sale doc-
trine, the Supreme Court greatly reduced publishers’ ability to profit by 
charging higher prices for books sold in the U.S.190 The first sale doctrine’s 
application will impact the profitability of publishing corporations. Old 
international market barriers that ensured cheaper international books 
stayed in the original country have been eradicated. This comment further 
 
 183.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 184.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The exclusive distribution 
right is limited by the first sale doctrine, an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that allows 
owners of copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies.”). 
 185.  17 U.S.C. § 109 (2002).  
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asserts that publishers will attempt to minimize the adverse impact on their 
profitability by removing the application of the first sale doctrine. 
Textbook rentals have become a fruitful market for retailers,191 and 
publishers have quickly joined the race to rent textbooks to students.192  
Furthermore, considering the newly announced “pay-to-see” licensing 
structure developed by Aspen Publishing,193 the shift to exclusive textbook 
rental or leases has begun.194  Allowed to grow, this shift will make the first 
sale doctrine an antiquated notion. Though this may seem like a huge leap 
of logic and mere speculation, articulating how this shift is likely to grow 
in the coming years is critical in defending the very existence of the first 
sale doctrine. 
If Congress undertakes an examination now, investigating alternatives 
to avoiding this anti-alienation movement before publishers become totally 
engrained in the rental/leasing business, it will be much easier to transition 
away from overly restrictive licenses of physical books.  In order to find a 
workable solution to ameliorate the harsh results of licensing physical cop-
yrighted material by way of rental– just to avoid the first sale doctrine– our 
copyright laws must fully embrace and then uphold the fragile balance 
between copyright owners’ rights and the betterment of society by the way 
of promoting knowledge.195 
III. THE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR PHYSICAL BOOKS 
With the waterfront covered, a guide for leasing books can be made.196  
According to recent jurisprudence, in order to create an enforceable license 
for copyrighted content, including physical books, a publisher will first 
need to expressly state that the book transfer is a lease and is not a sale.197  
Furthermore, the purchaser would need to agree with the terms and condi-
tions of the book lease, which could be presented as a shrink-wrap agree-
ment where the consumer can return the book for the full purchase price if 
the consumer decides they do not agree with the terms.198  This section of 
the license would avoid the pitfall found in UMG, where a lack of an 
agreement was used to evidence a lack of a license.199 
 
 191.  Id.  
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 195.  See McKenzie supra note 73 at 58. 
 196.  See supra Section III. and accompanying text. 
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Next, the agreement must restrict the reader’s ability to transfer the 
book.200  The stricter the inalienability clause, the more likely a license will 
be found.201  Lastly, the lease should include use-restrictions that are re-
pugnant to rights normally found in book sales.202  For example, no high-
lighting, no copying for any reason–including those reasons that would be 
considered fair use under copyright laws, and no lending, renting, or sub-
leasing.203  Together, these restrictions would most likely create a license 
under existing jurisprudence.204  And finally for good measure, to fully 
evidence the fact that the title of the book does not pass to the consumer, 
the book should either be returned after a stated period,205 or destroyed after 
the expiration date of the lease. 
With the aforementioned guide, a publisher could create a physical 
book lease that would preclude the consumer from raising the first sale 
doctrine.  If these types of leases become the norm, the intent of copyright 
would be destroyed. The impact would be devastating. Many important 
institutions, like libraries and secondary used markets would be eliminat-
ed.206  These types of leases would excessively disrupt the balance between 
the primary and secondary copyright beneficiaries. 
IV. SOLUTIONS: MAINTAINING THE BALANCE 
Scholars have already begun talking about the next great copyright 
act.207  And since it is expected to come to fruition within the next few 
years, now is the time to think about solutions to problems caused by rapid-
ly evolving technology.208  Maintaining the balance between the rights of 
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the copyright holder and the rights of society must be of the highest priori-
ty.209 The first sale doctrine, which is deeply rooted in American copyright 
and necessary to maintain this balance, must continue to provide a coun-
terweight to over-zealous copyright holders who attempt to extend their 
monopoly beyond its allowable scope.210 
A. Resolving the Licensing Problem 
It is not the intention of this comment to infer that all licenses are bad 
or evil, and therefore, should be legislated into extinction.  This comment 
presents a more narrow view, which is– licenses that restrict alienability of 
freely purchased goods– whether physical or electronic, such as books, 
music, and movies should not be allowed. Such licenses extend the copy-
right owner’s monopoly beyond the primary intent of the Constitution and 
are detrimental to society.211  Therefore, the first sale doctrine should apply 
to books, music, and movies, regardless of their format, and subsequent 
alienation should not be restricted.212 
1. Direct Congressional Legislation 
One way to resolve this problem would be for Congress to act by di-
rectly legislating an expressed provision that disallows the licensing of 
analog books, music, and movies.  This provision must also be broad 
enough to cover future technology.  Nonetheless, this solution is not with-
out its obvious flaws. 
One such problem is that the copyright holder is essentially denied 
certain rights that a purchaser of the same material is granted.213  These 
rights consist of the ability to rent and lease.214  It could be argued that a 
copyright holder should have the right to distribute his copyrighted material 
in any way he sees fit.215  However, this argument is inherently flawed, as 
this understanding was not the primary intent for giving the copyright hold-
er a monopoly.216  This argument is analogous to the argument that, as an 
owner of real property, “I should be allowed to do anything I want with my 
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property.” This assumption of property rights is entirely inaccurate,217 just 
as the idea that a copyright holder should be allowed to do anything he 
wishes with his copyrighted material.218  It must be remembered that in 
exchange for a copyright holder’s monopoly right, society must also re-
ceive something in return.219 
It should be noted that copyright was not simply drafted into the Con-
stitution to permit a copyright holder to withhold her creations from socie-
ty.220  Rather, it was to encourage the artist to spend time cultivating her 
creativity so as to create a more learned society-at-large.221  And with this 
pronouncement, a copyright holder should not be allowed to default on this 
constitutionally created exchange.222  Therefore, in enacting the next copy-
right act, Congress must not only address the modern diluted view of the 
intent of copyright,223 it must also address how every law contained therein 
has been enacted to obtain the ends of creating a learned society.224 
2. No Demarcation Between Digital and Physical Copyrighted Mate-
rial 
The second solution would be to put digital media on the same legal 
footing as physical copyright.225  This will ensure that each sale of digital 
media is guaranteed the first sale doctrine defense.226  As with the enact-
ment stated above, this too has its foreseeable issues.227  As recognized in 
the ReDigi case, there is a substantial problem contained within every con-
veyance of digital media.228  The problem is finding a way to convey digital 
media without creating a copy of the original digital file.229  However, this 
problem is not as extreme as it may sound. Under our current copyright 
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law, 17 U.S.C. § 117 contains a defense to software infringement, which 
allows copying of copyright software if it is an “essential step” in utilizing 
the computer program.230  This defense– similar to the first sale doctrine– is 
afforded only to an owner of a legally acquired copy.231  Therefore, if digi-
tal media is characterized as owned by the purchaser instead of licensed, 
then this “essential step” defense could easily be expanded by Congress to 
include media. 
If however, placing digital media completely on the same footing as 
physical copyrighted material is too progressive, there must at least be a 
narrower codification of a digital first sale doctrine that allows subsequent 
alienation of legally acquired copies.232  By creating such a defense to in-
fringement, publishers would be precluded from circumventing the first 
sale doctrine in digital media sales.233  This digital first sale doctrine would, 
without any further legislation, help the Judiciary understand the legislative 
intent to disallow anti-alienation licenses. This doctrine would further bol-
ster the resolve to disallow the same anti-alienation for physical copyright-
ed material.234 
3. Maintaining a Congressionally Recognized Directive: Create Ac-
cord Among the International Copyright Community 
Congress has a record of extending copyright holder protect under the 
guise of international accord.235 Specifically, the language of the Copyright 
Term Extension Act (hereinafter CTEA) was essentially founded upon the 
idea of aligning the U.S. with international copyright norms.236 Even in the 
face of great criticism,237 Congress has displayed strong determination in 
ensuring that U.S. Copyright laws maintain harmony with evolving interna-
tional standards.238 This commitment is evidenced by many different con-
gressional reports.239 
Senator Hatch, in referring to the term extension of the 1976 Copy-
right Act, stated that international accord was one of the primary justifica-
tions for extending copyright terms. Specifically, he stated: 
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In adopting the life-plus-50 term, Congress cited three primary justifica-
tions for the change: (1) the need to conform the U.S. copyright term 
with the prevailing worldwide standard; (2) the insufficiency of the U.S. 
copyright term to provide a fair economic return for authors and their 
dependents; and, (3) the failure of the U.S. copyright term to keep pace 
with the substantially increased commercial life of copyrighted works re-
sulting from the rapid growth in communications media.240 
Sen. Hatch then used this same logic to advocate for an extension to 
the term limit, yet again, in the CTEA.241 Sen. Hatch stated that 
“[c]learly. . . America stands to lose a significant part of its international 
trading advantage if our copyright laws do not keep pace with emerging 
international standards.”242 Considering this passion to harmonize our cop-
yright laws with the international community, it should be easy to import 
solutions from abroad. A recent European Court of Justice case may pro-
vide a blueprint for future digital media law in the U.S. 
In 2012, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ), in UsedSoft 
v. Oracle, found that a perpetual software license was equivalent to a sale 
to which the first sale doctrine applied.243  The software at issue was a digi-
tal version, as it was downloaded from Oracle’s website and not affixed in 
any tangible form.244 Unlike the ReDigi case, the ECJ found no distinction 
between analog and digital goods when applying the first sale doctrine.245 
Oracle allowed free software downloads from its website but charged 
for the license code, which the court found necessary and indivisible to the 
software as a whole.246  The reseller, UsedSoft, sold previously purchased 
license numbers to its customers.247 Customers simply downloaded the 
software from Oracle’s website and used the license number to register the 
software.248 To resolve this dispute, the court had to decide whether the 
purported license agreement was actually a license.249 
In finding that this transaction was actually the sale of software, the 
court found the perpetual nature of the agreement to be a decisive factor.250  
The use of the software was unlimited in time, and value was paid for this 
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use.251 The court held that this was technically a sale of software to which 
the first sale doctrine applied.252  The ECJ’s analysis recognized that if it 
upheld a perpetual license agreement, it would essentially render the first 
sale doctrine ineffective.253 
This model, if imported to the United States, would greatly reduce the 
ability to use licensing agreements to sidestep the first sale doctrine in both 
analog and digital works. It would also ameliorate the uneasy development 
of licensing physical copyrighted content to further circumvent the first 
sale doctrine.  Moreover, it would harmonize international markets, which 
is a major congressional concern.254 
Furthermore, this development in Europe creates conflicting interna-
tional law that makes international digital trade more difficult. In the words 
of Rep. Hatch, we need to “keep pace with emerging international stand-
ards.”255 However, the real question is whether Congress will recognize an 
international standard that reduces the stronghold copyright holders cur-
rently enjoy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Whether Congress enacts legislation that provides digital media iden-
tical rights to those found in the physical copyright world, expressly disal-
lows licensing models for analog books, or creates legal harmony with our 
European counter-parts, the issues raised herein must be addressed.  The 
current imbalance in our copyright law will only continue to injure society– 
copyright’s primary beneficiary. Copyright law evolves rapidly, leaving 
many courts and legislators behind. However, as scholars, students, and 
practitioners articulate the inherent problems within our copyright system, 
the hope is that our voices are heard.  It is with this understanding that I 
have produced this comment. 
The rapid advancement of the digital world should be embraced for 
what it can bring to our society in terms of education, not feared for its 
ability to foster unlawful acts.  Erosion of the first sale doctrine must not be 
allowed to occur based upon these fears. Avoidance of the first sale doc-
trine is a growing trend in the U.S. It is my hope that by engaging in a more 
thorough examination of the first sale doctrine– its origin, usefulness, and 
primary beneficiaries– we will not allow copyright holders to preclude its 
use by using restrictive licensing agreements. 
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